Towards a Post Reductionist Science: The Open Universe by Kauffman, Stuart
ar
X
iv
:0
90
7.
24
92
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.hi
st-
ph
]  
15
 Ju
l 2
00
9 Towards a Post Reductionist Science:
The Open Universe
Stuart Kauffman
July 8, 2009
Institute for Biocomplexity and Informatics
The University of Calgary
Signal Processing, Tampere University of Technology
External Professor, The Santa Fe Institute
Abstract
We have lived with a world view dominated by reductionism. Yet re-
cently, S. Hawking has written an article entitled ”Godel and the End of
Physics”. His observations raise the possibility that we should question
our foundations. Core to this is reductionism itself. In turn reductionism
finds its roots in Aristotle’s model of scientific explanation as deductive
inference: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is
a mortal. With Newton’s laws in differential form, reductionsim snaps
into place, for given initial and boundary conditions, integration of those
equations is exactly deduction. Aristotle’s ’efficient cause’ becomes math-
ematized as deduction. In this paper I discuss the reality that deductive
inference is not the only way we explain in science. Darwin gave us the
Blind Watchmaker, the appearance of design without a designer. I discuss
the role of the opportunity for an adaptation in the biosphere and claim
that such an opportunity is a ’blind final cause’, not an efficient cause,
yet shapes evolution. I also argue that Darwinian exaptations are not
describable by sufficient natural law. Based on an argument of Sir Karl
Popper, I claim that no law, or function, f, maps a decoherence process
in a Special Relativity setting from a specific space-time slice into its fu-
ture. If true this suggests there can be no theory of everything entailing
all that happens. I then discuss whether we can view laws as ’enabling
constraints’ and what they enable. Finally, in place of the weak Anthropic
principle in a multiverse, I suggest that we might consider Darwin all the
way down. It is not impossible that a single universe has an abiotic nat-
ural selection process for laws as enabling constraints and that the single
universe that ’wins’ is ours. One possible criterion of winning might be
’most rapid growth of the Adjacent Possible of the universe’.
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Introduction
We have lived in a scientific world view dominated by reductionism for at least
350 years. Reductionism, in S. Weinberg’s view, (1) holds that all that unfolds
in the universe is logically entailed by the fundamental laws of physics. In the
past thirty five years, doubts as to the full adequacy of reductionism have been
increasingly voiced, even in physics. Philip Anderson’s ”More is Different”, (2)
and Robert Laughlin’s ”A Different Universe”, (3), are major examples of this
doubt Recently, Stephen Hawking has written an article entitled ”Godel and
the End of Physics”, (4), suggesting that no finite set of laws may suffice to
describe by entailment the evolution of the universe. If reductionism proves
both profoundly useful but ultimately inadequate, as I think it does, this failure
must portend a major change in our scientific world view. What might follow
reductionism as a more fully adequate approach? I argue that, as this foundation
is pulled from under us, it portends a partially lawless open and creative universe
of profound new interest.
The heart of what I want to explore begins with this: The very laws of physics
may be open to being viewed as enabling constraints - enabling constraint laws
selected by an abiotic natural selection among a set of possible laws to yield our
extremely complex universe. And our single universe, not the multiverse and
its attending weak Anthropic principle, may be the ’winning’ universe that is
enabled by the opportunities afforded by those laws. In winning, our universe
would then have evolved its laws such that the winning universe is ours. I will
discuss initial ideas about what ’winning’ might mean below.
By appealing to an abiotic natural selection on a set of laws, this view goes
beyond reductionism and explanation purely via logical entailment. As we shall
see, Darwin’s natural selection goes beyond entailment. We have been taught
that science answers only ’how questions’. For example, given Newton’s laws
and the Newtonian world view, Newton’s laws answer how celestial mechanics
occurs. But there is no answer to the question, ’Why Newton’s Laws’? Sci-
entific enquiry must stop, on the reductionist view, with the ultimate law, for
example Weinberg’s Dreams of a Final Theory, (1). But Darwin’s natural se-
lection answers ’why’ questions - why has the vertebrate eye emerged in the
evolution of the universe? Because of a sequence of adaptations achieved by
Natural Selection, thus achieving what philosopher David Depew calls ’blind
teleology’,(5). Darwin reaches beyond reductionism because his ’why’ question
rests on what I shall call ’blind final cause’, as is captured in Richard Dawkins
famous book, ”The Blind Watchmaker”, (6). I will argue that the opportunity
for an adaptation in the biosphere, or for the universe as a whole, is just such
a blind final cause, subsequently achieved by efficient causes. I will suggest and
hope to persuade the reader that blind final cause is not efficient cause. This
issue will prove central to our discussion. In sharp contrast, since Descartes and
Newton, science has been bound to explain the unfolding of the universe purely
in terms of Aristotle’s ’efficient cause’, mathematized as logical entailment. This
assumption is the root of our long faith in reductionism. Given this assump-
tion and the mathematization of efficient cause as entailment, the deductive
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explanatory, and tautological character, of reductionism is set in place. There
is no room for ’lawless creativity’ in this world view. The logical possibility
of blind final cause, in the evolution of the biosphere, or even the universe as
a whole, renders restriction to our familiar reductionism logically unnecessary,
thus goes beyond our familiar reductionism. Again, reductionism and the con-
sequent faith in deductive entailment yields a universe barren of creativity, a
tautological realm entailed by the hoped for theory of everything. In contrast,
if ’law’ is enabling constraint, and that enablement enables opportunities that
can, blindly, be seized by the becoming of the universe in its full becoming, then
the universe is open to myriad creativity. The universe is open in ways we have
not dreamed in Western science since Descartes.
This article is organized as follows: In Section 1, I briefly review Aristotle’s
four causes and his model of scientific explanation in the syllogism. Newton’s
laws, plus initial and boundary conditions then sets the stage for reductionism,
with us today, and leads to Hawking’s ”Godel and the End of Physics”. I end
Section 1 by raising the question whether our sole reliance on efficient cause
in science since Newton may be a foundational problem. In Section 2, I raise
the issue of blind final cause in the evolution of the biosphere in the achieve-
ment of adaptations that alter the course of the biosphere’s evolution, hence
that of the universe. Blind final causes are ’opportunities’ for adaptations in
a selective niche blindly seized by evolution. The selective niche is, itself, not
an efficient cause, but a blind final cause of the successful emergence of the
adaptation. The selective niche shapes the course of evolution, but is not an
efficient cause of that evolution. The adaptation is achieved by efficient causes.
The universe is open in ways beyond logical entailment. In Section 3, I describe
new grounds to think that the evolution of the biosphere by Darwinian exap-
tations, or ’preadaptations’ is not describable by sufficient natural law, where
natural laws are compact descriptions of the regularities of a process. As we
will see, the implications of this evolution by Darwinian preadaptations is that
we cannot make probability statements about such evolution since we do not
know the sample space of possibilities in what I will call the Adjacent Possible
of the biosphere, that in place of sufficient entailing law is a ceaseless creativity,
and that the generation of ’information’ in the biosphere does not fit Shannon’s
theory, where Shannon information requires prior knowledge of the ensemble
of messages. More the becoming of the biosphere is both partially lawless, yet
non-random - a concept we do not yet have in physics. If these claims are cor-
rect, it appears that there can be no entailing Theory of Everything (TOE).
In Section 4, I discuss the issue of whether the co-evolution of the quantum-
classical boundary is describable by sufficient natural law and suggest that it is
not. In its place may be an abiotic natural selection blind final cause. These
ideas seem to have experimental consequences. In Section 5, I discuss enabling
constraints and what they enable. We have not even the beginning of a theory
here, but need to develop one. I will discuss the fact that in the evolution of
the biosphere, evolution has itself achieved enabling constraints that have im-
proved the very process of evolution. If we can view law as enabling constraints,
then the biosphere is evolving its own laws such that it evolves better. If so,
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then it becomes thinkable that the universe has evolved its laws as well. I will
sketch an initial approach to what I believe is a non-algorithmic process with
an algorithmic set of board games, legal move sets on those board games and
the possibilities enabled by those legal rules. The approach is inadequate, but a
start. In Section 6, I discuss our current cosmological conundrum, the apparent
fine tuning of the 23 constants of nature, which has led to the suggestion of
a multiverse and the weak Anthropic principle. We are driven to a multiverse
hypothesis by reductionism itself. But that reductionism may no longer be all
we need. An alternative reductionist hope is that there really is a TOE, and we
are left to wonder why this, rather than another TOE, describes the universe.
In place of these familiar theories, I raise the possibility that the laws of physics
are enabling constraints that enable a very complex universe, laws that were
selected from some set of possible laws early in the history of the universe by
blind final cause for a ’winning’ persistent and complex universe, and point to
some features of physical laws that are puzzling but interesting hints in this con-
text, including various conservation laws. To pursue the above agenda, if it has
merit, will require an entire new body of theory concerning enabling constraints
and what they enable. In the final Section 7, I try to discuss the puzzling role
and status of the possible in the origin and history of the universe.
1 Aristotle and the Mathematization of
Efficient Causes
Aristotle famously held that there were four causes, formal, final, material and
efficient. In a simple example of a house to be constructed, the formal cause
of the house is the blueprint. The material causes of the house are the bricks,
mortar, beams, and building material. The final cause of the house is my
decision to build the house. The efficient cause is the actual process of its
construction. But Aristotle, as R. Rosen points out in Life Itself (7), also offered
a model of scientific explanation in the syllogism: All men are mortal. Socrates
is a man. Therefore Socrates is a mortal. The logical ’force’ of this logical
entailment may play a later role in our sense that natural efficient cause laws
govern rather than describe the unfolding of the universe.
Newton’s laws, given as differential equations in a state space with initial
and boundary conditions, fulfill Aristotle’s form of scientific explanation as en-
tailment, for the integration of the differential equations is precisely deduction.
With Newton, Aristotle’s other causes, formal, final, and material, largely re-
cede from science, which takes itself to explain purely in terms of efficient cause,
mathematized as logical entailment.
That this is the base of reductionism is already evident in Laplace’s famous
claim that a massive computing system, if given the positions and momenta of
all the particles in the universe, could, using Newton’s laws, predict or retrodict
the entire future and past of the universe. I note four features of Laplace’s
reductionism: i. All laws are deterministic, now in doubt given quantum me-
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chanics and the Copenhagen interpretation including the Born rule. ii. All that
exists ontologically in the universe are particles in motion. iii. All that happens
in the universe is describable by sufficient efficient cause laws via deductive en-
tailment. iv. There exists at least one language, here Newton’s, to describe all
of reality. None of these four claims will remain unchallenged below. With the
addition of fields, quantum mechanics and General Relativity, plus the standard
model, we have contemporary reductionist physics and Hawking’s doubts, (4).
Indeed, Hawking, in seeing in Godel the potential ’end of physics’, does so in
terms of the pure sufficiency of a mathematized form of efficient cause law. It
is in terms of such mathematized efficient cause laws that he fears an infinite
set of such laws.
When such a crisis as Hawking hints arises, one recourse is to doubt the fun-
damental assumptions we make. The use of efficient cause as the sole explana-
tory principle may be just that assumption. I now claim that this assumption
is false.
2 Blind Final Cause in Biological Evolution
Darwin may rank as the mind who most changed our world view, for with
Darwin we are given, in Richard Dawkin’s fine phrase, ”the Blind Watchmaker”,
that is, the emergence in the biosphere of the appearance of design without a
designer - the teleonomy of which J. Monod speaks so eloquently in Chance and
Necessity,(8). In this 150th year since Darwin’s Origin of Species, we are still
grappling with the implications of his central idea. Philosopher David Depew
at a recent conference on Darwin and Evolution,(5), spoke of the achievement
of an adaptation, say the eye, or even a red light sensitive cell in the progeny
of an organism with no light sensitivity, as a ’blind teleology’. Depew had in
mind just what Darwin told us. This is Monod’s teleonomy - the appearance
of design without a designer. There is no doubt the eye is an adaptation -
indeed the similarity of the vertebrate eye, so resembling a camera, is stunning.
As Monod forcefully points out, only life appears able to do this. Of course,
the eye has evolved multiple time, but that is beside the point I raise. Other
adaptations are unique.
I now raise a central issue. Can we speak of an opportunity for an adap-
tation before it occurs? With thanks to G. Kaufman, (9), I translate such an
opportunity for an adaptation, A, as ’A is possible. A might or might not oc-
cur. If A occurs it will tend to be selected and fixed in the population’. Now it
becomes a critical issue to ask what kind of a ’cause’ is the opportunity for an
adaptation, which, if achieved, may change the course of biological evolution. It
is clear that the actual achievement of the adaptation is via a series of efficient
causes. However, the tendency to be selected is a dispositional term, untrans-
latable into any finite set of necessary and sufficient efficient cause conditions,
or actual events, for the achievement of fixation of the adaptation. This means
that we cannot state ahead of time the efficient causes by which a particular
adaptation will come to be achieved. But is the opportunity for the adaptation
5
itself, the very fact that the eye is an adaptation - subsequently achieved by
non-prestatable efficient causes - itself an efficient cause? Certainly the oppor-
tunity for an adaptation is not an efficient cause in the straight forward sense
of billiard balls hitting billiard balls. Nor in more sophisticated terms, such
as Maxwell’s equations which are descriptions of efficient causes, is the oppor-
tunity for an adaptation in any clear sense an efficient cause. Further, for a
system with a potential, such as a ball rolling down a warped hill, where a least
action principle can be found, that least action gives a superficial appearance
of a final cause. But there is no hint that the achievement of an adaptation is
a flow on a potential for which a least action principle might be found. And
again the ’tendency’ to become fixed by selection in the population is not, as
noted, reducible to any actual (efficient cause) events that are necessary and
sufficient for fixation to occur. Thus it does not seem that we can translate the
opportunity for an adaptation into any set of e fficient cause events.
Addy Pross has given a very interesting analysis of this issue in the biological
realm, (10,11). He distinguishes between thermodynamic selection, which tends
toward thermodynamic equilibrium, and ’kinetic selection’ among replicators
for those which maximize a kinetic stability, not a thermodynamic stability.
Pross’s central point is that cells, as open thermodynamic systems, are unstable
thermodynamically, but kinetically stable - they are the winners of a kinetic race
in a ’space of replicators’. I think Pross’s insight is important, for in the simple
case of, say bare replicators, the opportunity for an adaptation is a means to
replicate faster to higher copy number, hence, as he says, higher kinetic stability.
Yet Darwin’s fully biotic selection, and the economic selection of goods and
services which survive in the market place, both analogous to Pross’s kinetic
selection, may go beyond any simple sense of ’winning the kinetic race’. A
butterfly may forego more rapid reproduction if ’K’ selected for carrying capacity
in a nutrient limited environment, rather than ’R’ selection for replication rate.
I comment that David Deutsch (12) has written extensively on quantum
mechanics and evolution.
I give next four examples, two economic, then two biological, also referred
to below in the section on enabling constraints, to argue that opportunities for
adaptation are blind final causes in the case of the biosphere, and full Aristote-
lean final causes in the case of the economy, with the assumption of responsible
free willed economic actors in the latter case. Consider the following economic
facts. In the early 1980s in North America, there were many television stations,
abundant programming, many television sets, and, perhaps sadly, a multitude
of couch potatoes. In the face of this economic niche, was there an opportunity
to invent and successfully market the television remote channel changer? Yes of
course there was and one could obtain venture funding to do so. Now I ask, was
the economic niche mentioned above an efficient cause of the invention of the
television remote? No, it was, rather, as described below, an enabling condition,
or enabling constraint, that a fforded the opportunity to invent and make money
with the television remote. Now consider the following: In 1943, the computer
was invented to calculate shell trajectories in World War II. Some thirty years
later, the invention of the computer afforded the opportunity to invent and mar-
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ket widely the personal computer. IBM and Apple made substantial money on
the venture. With the invention of the personal computer and its wide sale, the
opportunity arose to invent and market word processing, and Microsoft made
money doing so. But the invention of word processing afforded the opportu-
nity to store word files. In turn, stored files afforded the opportunity to share
files between CERN colleagues, which in turn led to the economic-technological
niche opportunity to invent and spread the world wide web. In turn, the web
afforded the opportunity, the niche, where web commerce could find a home
and EBay flourished. In turn, the abundance of information on the web created
the oppo rtunity, the economic niche, for the invention of web portals such as
Google. Now we have achieved the summit of Western civilization with Face-
book. Or, consider the flourishing of ”aps” on cell phones and the growth of
text messaging. Note how each of these opportunities, or enabling conditions,
created a niche into which the next invention made economic sense. But the
opportunities were not efficient causes of the inventions.
It might be thought that the story above relies on human conscious invention,
but the same processes obtain for the evolution of the biosphere. Organisms oc-
cupy niches. As new organisms evolve, new niches are created. But a niche, for
example, that occupied by rabbits, is not an efficient cause of the evolution of
rabbits to fill and persist by existence in that niche. Rather, the niche is an op-
portunity which evolution blindly seizes, and adaptations to fill that niche arise
and are selected by efficient cause events as the adaptations tend to be selected
by natural selection. The niche is not an efficient cause of those adaptations,
although the actual steps of adaptation are themselves achieved by efficient
causes. Rather the niche is, as emphasized below, an enabling constraint that
allows rabbits to arise and ’make a living’ in that niche.
A wonderful further set of examples arise in co-evolution. Consider flowers,
insects and birds such as humming birds. Flowers feed the birds and insects
nectar. Pollen rubs off on the insects and birds, is transferred to another flower
and pollinates the latter. Each is the niche of the other, and flowers, insects
and birds have co-evolved their mutual niches for millions of years. Step by
step flowers found new adaptations to attract insects and birds and manage to
be fertilized by insects and birds, and the latter adapted the stickiness of their
hairs and beaks for pollen, and food gathering behavior, to carry out that fertil-
ization. The adaptation steps were achieved by efficient causes. The wondrous
mutual emergence of the diversity of flowers and insects and humming birds
as mutual co-evolutionary adaptations of ever creating niches is not efficient
cause. Each of the mutualists gradually builds new opportunities for the other
in their evolutionary becoming. The Buddhists would call this ’co-dependent
origination’.
Physicists seeking a theory of everything from which all is entailed by de-
duction cannot ignore the biosphere’s becoming, let alone culture, economics,
and history where we become confused about consciousness and free will. Yet
the evolution of the biosphere, say before consciousness evolved, is squarely in
the purported purview of the physicist such as Weinberg. But he cannot deduce
this becoming, for opportunities for adaptations are not efficient causes, yet,
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once achieved by efficient causes, alter the course of evolution of the biosphere.
I conclude that the opportunity for an adaptation is an opportunity for
natural selection to select what will succeed in the current selective environment,
and is a blind final cause, not an efficient cause. It may be pointed out here
that with Darwin and with ourselves, it is essential that we feel it appropriate to
use the phrase ’succeed in the current selective environment’. The red spotted
organism will be a winner in Darwin’s struggle for existence. But the very
phrase ’struggle for existence’ is, as philosopher Dan Cloud pointed out to me,
to place the process of natural selection in a problem solving framework. But a
problem solving framework is not a mere description of what happens, as is the
description of a ball rolling down a hill. It is, in fact, true that the red spotted
organism that is light sensitive is actually fitter than its non-light sensitive rivals
in its selective environment. This fact that this organism is actually fitter in the
given environment is why - not how, but why - this fitter organism is selected.
’How’ the selection actually occurs is a sequence of efficient causes such that
the fitter organism dispositionally ’tends’ to win. But we cannot state what
those efficient causes must be. Again, I conclude that the opportunity for an
adaptation is a blind final cause, not an efficient cause of what merely happens.
This is an essential step, for it claims that the becoming of the biosphere is
not sufficiently describable only by efficient causes. But this will imply that
the becoming of the universe including the biosphere is not describable only by
entailment from mathematicized efficient cause laws. In turn, this means that
we are not limited to the tautological entailments of a final theory of everything,
and that an open creativity beyond entailment is present in the unfolding of the
biosphere, economy, history, and perhaps the universe as a whole.
I remark preliminarily that to speak of an opportunity for an adaptation,
we seem forced to deal with the fact that the adaptation is ’possible’. Already
in Quantum Mechanics and the Schrodinger equation with Copenhagen and
the Born rule, we speak of the Schrodinger wave as a ’possibility wave’ which,
when its modulus is squared, gives the probability of observing possibilities
that we know beforehand. We will soon see that the evolution of the biosphere
seems to force us to a wider possible, where we do not know beforehand what
the possibilities are. All this is puzzling. In General Relativity and the block
spacetime universe, there are only world lines, actuals, and no possibles. We
shall have to begin to inquire about the status of the possible.
3 The Evolution of the Biosphere by Darwinian
’Preadaptations’ is Partially Lawless
Were we to ask Darwin the function of the human heart, he would say it is to
pump blood. Were we to point out that the heart makes heart sounds and moves
water in the pericardial sac, he would say these effects are not the function of
the heart. If we asked why not, he would reply that the heart was selected, so
exists in the universe, because it was of selective advantage to pump blood in
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some ancestor and the lineage leading to us.
Already this is interesting because, were the physicist to succeed in deducing
all the causal properties of the heart from its subatomic constituents, she would
have no way to pick out pumping blood as the biological function of the heart
and the putative reason hearts came to exist in the universe. To describe the
function of the heart, she would have to become a paleontologist and evolution-
ary biologist, or to simulate the evolution of the biosphere, or deduce from her
theory of everything the emergence of the heart. In two books, Investigations
and Reinventing the Sacred,(13,14), I argue that she cannot simulate or deduce
the emergence of the heart in the unfolding of the universe. Quantum events
matter in evolution, at least by causing mutations. There is no way to simulate
all the quantum processes that have occurred, including random cosmic rays,
or, in accord with Schrodinger, might have occurred, in the history of the past
5 billion years of the earth, let alone u niverse. How would one simulate the
all the possible consequences of all the possible temporal instants of a radioac-
tive decay, or a quantum coherent electron transfer in some protein in some
organism in some environment? Now consider doing so for all the quantum
events in the past 5 billion year history of the Earth and evolving biosphere.
More there is no way to confirm that any such simulation captures the actual
quantum history of this biosphere’s evolution. But can the physicist deduce the
becoming of the human heart in evolution, or evolution more generally. I now
argue that the answer is a resounding ’No’. If I am correct, it appears to have
major implications.
Darwin spoke of the fact that a feature of an organism, with some causal
property of no selective significance in the current environment, might be of se-
lective value in a different selective environment, so be selected. Typically a new
function will arise in the biosphere. These events are called either ’exaptations’
or Darwinian ’preadaptations’. There is no concept of evolutionary foresight
here. It just happens to turn out that a property that is of no selective use in
one environment is of selective use in another environment.
I give two examples. Some fish have swim bladders. These are sacs, partially
filled with water, partially filled with air, that adjust neutral buoyancy in the
water column. Paleontologists believe that swim bladders evolved by exapata-
tion from lung fish. Water got into the lungs of some lung fish, now there was
a sac partially filled with air, partially with water, and so poised to evolve into
a swim bladder. Let us assume the paleontologists are correct. Now: Did a
new function arise in the biosphere? Of course, neutral buoyancy in the water
column. Did the swim bladder affect the further evolution of the biosphere? Of
course, new species, proteins, other molecules, and niches evolved. Here is a
second example. We have three middle ear bones to transmit sound from our
tympanic membrane to our inner ear. These evolved by preadaptation from
three adjacent jaw bones of an early teleost fish. This case is important because
relational ’degrees of freedom’ matter. If the three bones were not adjacent,
but were in the spine, skull and jaw, probably middle ear bones would not have
evolved. Again, did a new function come to exist in the biosphere? Yes, hear-
ing. Did this new function alter the evolution of the biosphere? Of course, new
9
species, proteins, niches.
I now come to the critical question: Do you think you could prestate all the
possible Darwinian exaptations of all organisms alive now? You might respond
that we do not know all organisms alive now. I simplify my question: Do you
think you could prestate all possible Darwinian exapatations just for humans?
I have now asked thousands of people. We all agree we cannot carry out this
task. Why not? I think parts of the problem are that we cannot prestate all
possible selective environments, nor know that we had listed them all. Nor can
we prestate all features of one or many organisms, including relational features,
that might turn out to be preadaptations. It is not clear how to prove this
claim. An experiment seems beside the point A theorem seems impossible at
least at present.
I now need to define the ’Adjacent Possible’. Consider a liter of buffer with
1000 different molecular species. Call this set the ’Actual’. Let them react
by a single reaction step. If new species of molecules appear, call these ’The
Adjacent Possible’. Clearly this is well defined in the chemical case, given a
minimal life time of stability for a species. Now let me point to the Adjacent
Possible of the biosphere. Once there were lung fish, swim bladders were in the
Adjacent Possible of the biosphere. Before there were multicelled organisms,
swim bladders were not in the Adjacent Possible of the biosphere. Admittedly,
I use some poorly defined sense of ’adjacent’ here.
Now if we do not know all the possible preadaptations that might arise in
the adjacent possible of the biosphere, then not only do we not know what
will happen, we do not even know what can happen! Can we make probability
statements about the evolution of the biosphere by preadaptations? Consider
flipping a coin 10,000 times. It will come up heads about 5000 times, with a
binomial distribution. But notice that we knew ahead of time all the possibili-
ties, all heads, all tails, and so forth. We knew the sample space of the process,
so could erect a probability measure on the frequency interpretation of prob-
abilities for this coin flipping process. But we do not know the sample space
of the evolution of the biosphere by preadaptations, so can make no probability
statements about it. Now Laplace had a different interpretation of probability.
If confronted by N doors, behind one of which was a treasure, but we had no
idea which door, our chances of picking the right door is 1/N. But notice that
we know N, the number of doors. We do not know N for the evolution of the
biosphere, so can make no probability statements about this process.
If a natural law is a compact description of the regularities of a process, can
we have a sufficient natural law for the emergence of swim bladders? No. We
cannot even state the possibility of the emergence of swim bladders, let alone
their probability. Thus we cannot have a law that is sufficient for describing the
emergence of swim bladders.
This is a major conclusion. The becoming of the biosphere is partially beyond
sufficient natural law. Yet it is also non-random. There is no sufficient law
for the becoming of the swim bladder, yet this new organ does make sense and
is selected in its selective environment, hence its evolutionary emergence is not
random. We have no such concepts in physics of a partially lawless yet non-
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random process. But the biosphere appears to be doing just this. The same
is true in the economy, culture and history. But if the emergence of the swim
bladder is not describable by sufficient natural law, it is not entailed by any
theory of everything at the fundamental level of physics. Thus, there can be
no theory of everything! Nor can the evolution of the biosphere be deduced by
mathematized efficient causal law. This failure reinforces the conclusion that
adaptations are blind final causes, and our explanations of the becoming of the
universe are not limited to efficient cause laws. Notice that this discussion is not
that of Hawking about Godel and the End of Physics based on efficient cause
mathematical law and the possible inadequacy of any finite set of such laws,
which may also be valid in its own right.
It is important to pause for a claim about ’the furniture of the universe’. Are
swim bladders ontologically ’real’? Consider proteins length 200 amino acids.
How many are possible with 20 kinds of amino acids? 20 raised to the 200th
power, or about 10 to the 260th power. We can make any one of these we choose.
But were the 10 to the 80th particles in the known universe to do nothing,
ignoring space-like separation, on the Planck time scale of 10 to the -43rd seconds
but make proteins length 200 amino acids, it would require 10 to the 39th power
repetitions of the history of the universe to make all these proteins just once.
But this means that, at levels above stable atoms, the universe is on a unique,
utterly non-ergodic trajectory. Most complex things will never exist, so the
existence of the heart is no small matter. But if we cannot deduce the coming
into existence of hearts or swim bladders, and yet they have causal powers as
organized structures and processes, then hearts and swim bladders are emergent
with respect to the fundamental laws of physics and so are ontologically real
parts of the universe. We are not just particles in motion. Moreover, since
most complex things will never exist, the universe is indefinitely open upward
in complexity. And since efficient causes, mathematized as deductions, do not
suffice to describe the unfolding of the universe including the biosphere, the
universe is open and, for the biosphere and upward, vastly creative.
I also pause to note that the richly interwoven complexity of the biosphere
which has emerged cannot be captured by Shannon information. Shannon as-
sumes an ensemble of messages, in a prestated alphabet, where all possible
messages are known beforehand, and thus whose entropy can be calculated.
But we do not know the all the possibilities that evolution will unfold. We
do not know the alphabet of processes, entities, and functions that will emerge
and integrate into an evolving biosphere. Whatever information may be, a
vexed question, Shannon information does not seem to apply to the evolution
of the biosphere. Indeed, I do not think that this evolution is even algorithmic,
(13,14). Consider the famous Halting problem, where no compact description
of the behavior of some algorithm may be available. But for the next 11 steps,
or any finite number step of the universal Turing machine, all possible states,
in a prestated alphabet, of tape and head, can be listed. We cannot even get
started on the evolution of the biosphere by preadaptations. So our problem
with the evolution of the biosphere does not seem to be the same as the problem
of there being no compact description for an arbitrary algorithms behavior. We
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may well confront the issue that no language describes all of reality.
I end this section with an economic preadaptation, said to be a true story.
Engineers were trying to invent the tractor, so knew that a massive engine block
would be necessary. This was placed on a succession of chasses, all of which
broke. At last an engineer said, ”You know, the engine block itself is so big and
rigid, we can hang everything off the engine block and use it as the chasse”. This
novel use of the engine block is a Darwinian economic preadaptations. Economic
inventions are rife with similar examples and most inventions are not used for
their initial inventive purpose. This raises the issue of algorithmicity again. Can
we name all uses of a screw driver? No. This is the ’frame problem’ of computer
science, never solved. I think that the human mind, like the evolution of the
biosphere, is not algorithmic, and the evolution of the economy, culture, and
history are not describable by natural laws, (14). Indeed, historians, who do find
out about the real world, today largely eschew a search for the laws that Marx
sought. In part, history and cultural evolution, like the invention of Google, are
instances of opportunities seized - not merely efficient caused events.
4 Is the Coevolution of the Quantum Classical
Boundary Lawful?
As we consider the adequacy of reductionism, it becomes of interest to ask if
the boundary between the quantum and classical worlds, their co-evolution,
is lawful. In this section I borrow an argument from Sir Karl Popper in his
The Open Universe, (15), to suggest that this becoming is not describable by
sufficient efficient cause law. The ideas have testable consequences, in principle.
In Popper’s argument, the setting is Special Relativity. An event A has a
past light cone and a future light cone, with a zone of possible simultaneity
between them. An event B is in the future light cone of A. The past light cone
of B includes the past light cone of A, but includes regions that are space-like
separated so lie outside the past light cone of A. Popper then argues that, at
A, we cannot know the events in the past light cone of B that are outside the
past light cone of A but may influence event B, so we cannot have a law for the
event B before B occurs. If a law is a compact description of the regularities of
a process which an observer at A, and before event B, can construct, Popper’s
argument seems valid. If the observer is not located at A, then we will be driven
to an observer outside the universe, which seems inadmissible. Popper uses his
argument to support indeterminism.
My own setting depends upon the currently popular theory that the tran-
sition from quantum to classical is due to decoherence and loss of phase infor-
mation from the system to an environment, quantum, classical or both. The
loss of phase information to the environment means that the system gradually
loses the capacity to exhibit interference patterns like the two slit experiment,
the hallmark of quantum behavior. The transition to classical behavior is often
described as ’for all practical purposes’, (FAPP), since the system’s phase in-
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formation continues to exist in the environment. Take a setting like Popper’s.
For example consider a complex organic molecule in a dense solution of such
molecules, and an event A in which two emitted entangled quantum degrees
of freedom that move apart from that molecule and eventually are absorbed
by one or two detectors, event B, say classical, that recede from one another
at constant velocity, the Special Relativity setting. Then Popper’s argument
applies. Before the absorption by classical or other quantum degrees of free-
dom, we cannot know what events outside the past light cone of the complex
molecule, event A, and the receding quantum entangled particles, may impinge
upon decoherence upon absorption, event B, and EPR instantaneous correlation
with the quantum decohering molecular system from event A. Then we do not
know how decoherence happens in detail in that molecule. Then there can be no
efficient cause function, F, or law, for the detailed way decoherence of parts or
all of the complex molecule happens. Thus, it appears, we can have no law for
detailed decoherence in this Special Relativity setting. But quantum mechanics
and Special Relativity are consistent, as Dirac’s relativistic electron equation
argues. This claim implies that there is no efficient cause law, or function, that
maps the space time region including event A and the receding detectors before
event B, into a future that includes event B.
If there is no law, what can we say about what happens? I discuss this below.
If there can be no law, then it seems there can be no Theory of Everything from
which all that happens is entailed.
There can, of course, be statistical models of this decoherence process. But
such models are not detailed laws. However, if the above view is correct, it
seems to vitiate full reductionism - the dream that there is an efficient cause
law or set of laws that entails all that happens in the universe.
The situation is even more complex, for the transition from quantum to clas-
sical (for all practical purposes if you wish) and back is thought to be reversible.
Shor’s code for error correction in quantum computers, (16), shows that in a
quantum computer, decohering degrees of freedom can be made to recohere with
addition of information from the outside. H. Briegel has recently published two
papers, (17,18), arguing that a quantum entangled system can become classical
then fully quantum entangled again. Assume Shor and Briegel are correct. If
decoherence is lawless, then even if the classical to quantum transition is lawful,
the total quantum to classical to quantum reversible process must be lawless.
But that means that the coevolution of the quantum-classical world is not de-
scribable by efficient cause mathematical laws. Again, it seems there can be no
Theory of Everything.
Given our interest in Darwin and natural selection, it becomes of consid-
erable interest that a speculative abiotic natural selection process may arise at
the quantum-classical boundary. Decoherence seems likely to depend upon the
local quantum plus classical environment. The more complex the environment,
presumably the easier and more rapid decoherence of the system will be. Then
quantum degrees of freedom that have decohered to classicity for all practical
purposes, and are more resistant, in that complex ’selective environment’ to re-
turning to the purely quantum condition, will tend to persist as classical entities
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in the universe. This will depend upon the local ’classicity selective environment’
and is a possible form of abiotic natural selection with abiotic blind final cause
due to the (possibly changing) selective environment. This argument supplies
the start of an answer to ’what happens’ if there is no efficient cause function,
or law, at the quantum-classical boundary. For, as in the case of biological evo-
lution, the selective environment determines in part how readily a now classical
entity tends to remain classical rather than becoming quantum again by reco-
hering. ’Tends’ is again a dispositional term. The actual ways that decoherence
happens and is sustained against recoherence will depend upon actual detailed
quantum and classical processes. We cannot prestate those selective environ-
mental processes that are necessary and sufficient for the now classical (for all
practical purposes) entity to remain classical, FAPP. Thus, there is a process
carrying the system into the future, but no efficient cause law, or function,
describing it.
The above should be experimentally testable. In general, it is now believed
that complex entities decohere more rapidly than simple entities, eg electrons
and photons, which means a bias towards the emergence of classicity in complex
entities. Abiotic natural selection arises here with blind final cause, for we can-
not prestate all the complex environments which may impact decoherence in any
specific way. Anton Zeilinger has recently shown that Buckmeisterfullerenes in-
terfere in a two slit-like experiment. Presumably, as the complexity of the objects
in this experiment increases, and the complexity of the surrounding environment
increases, decoherence should begin to fail. As it does, it may be possible to ask
whether the decoherence process is fully lawful or not, for example, by failure
of stable statistics in fading interference bands. More, if the complexity of the
environment bears on decoherence, then at that molecular complexity when in-
terference begins to fail due to decoherence, one would expect that a dense ’beam’
of the objects sent through the two slits would behave more classically and show
less interference, than if the objects were sent through the two slits rarely. It
seems that the above are possible new experiments.
Finally, I note that D. d’Lambert commented to me that the above ideas
imply that the quantum measurement problem does not have a solution, (19).
Taken together these ideas, if correct, again seem to imply that there is no
Theory of Everything from which all is logically entailed. I comment that W.
Zureck might strongly disagree, (20).
5 Enabling Constraints and What They Enable
In about the year 1200 AD, the Calif of Cairo caused the only hospital in the
Islamic world to be constructed. Because patients were required to be treated
within the hospital, where Maimonides later practiced, it became possible to
train medieval physicians in a new manner. The hospital enabled a new form of
medical education and medical practice. More, the Calif was able, as a sign of
caring, to visit the patients in the hospital and thereby talk to poor people he
could not have met socially. This allowed the Calif to gain different information
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about his realm and govern differently.
The hospital acted as an enabling constraint or enabling condition, and
enabled changes in medical education, treatment and governance. We obviously
know this is true, but have virtually no clear ways to think about enabling
constraints or what they enable.
A second example was raised by A. Juarraro in Dynamics in Action, (21).
Could we cash a check 50,000 years ago? No. Think of all the social inventions
that had to occur to allow this bit of human action. Laws, courts, credit,
bankruptcy laws, enforcement procedures, contract law, all had to come into
existence. In the law, the concept of enabling constraints is known. If you and
I enter into a contract, we are thereby constrained, but may be enabled to form
a corporation by that contract, with all the enabled actions of a corporation in
the contemporary world. The stories above of the invention of the television
remote, and the sequence leading from the first computer to FaceBook, are
also examples of situations arising that create new economic niches and are
enabling constraints, but not efficient causes. The enabling constraints create
opportunities seized. We know this is true, but do not think about it. We have
no theory for it.
Enabling constraints arise in biological evolution. A signal case is the evo-
lution of meiosis, chromosomal recombination and sex. Sex causes a two fold
loss in fitness as two parents are required, not one. But sex allows meiosis and
chromosomal recombination between homologous paternal and maternal chro-
mosomes that permits two advantageous genes, say A and B, initially with one
on the maternal and one on the paternal chromosome, to recombine so A and
B are on one chromosome and passed via sperm or egg to the offspring. This
process is much faster than waiting for A to arise by mutation on the B bearing
chromosome, so abets more rapid and efficient evolution. In short, sex is an
enabling constraint! The biosphere is not only evolving, it is evolving the way it
is building itself. It is evolving the very way it is evolving. If sex and recombina-
tion yielded the emergence of Mendel’s laws, then life evolved its own enabling
constraint laws by which evolution itself became more efficient. Then might the
universe as a whole evolve its laws so that its becoming’ was more efficient in
a form of a Darwinian race among a set of candidate enabling constraint laws
and some definable notion of ’efficient’?
A second biological example almost certainly arose early in life. Current
cells use DNA, RNA, and encoded protein translation. But the process is very
complex, with transfer RNA and specific protein enzymes each of which charges
the appropriate transfer RNA with the ’right’ amino acid to allow proper trans-
lation of messenger RNA. The entire system is needed for the system to work.
Early in the evolution of life, proto-cells presumably were reproducing, perhaps
did work cycles, but could not have been so complex. Call the emergence of
DNA, RNA, and encoded protein synthesis ’the Darwinian Transition’. This
transition has become an enabling constraint. All of life since, presumably, the
last common ancestor, has used this molecular machinery: we are constrained
to it. Yet this machinery enables the rapid exploration of protein space by
mutations to DNA sequences not needed for core molecular reproduction. The
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biosphere, again, is evolving the very way it evolves. The DNA/RNA/protein
translation machinery is a powerful enabling constraint ’law’, the central Dogma
of molecular biology, that has enabled enhanced evolution.
These biological examples seem deeply important for, unlike human law, no
conscious agency is invoked. The biosphere is building the way it builds itself by
evolving law-like enabling constraints that enable enhanced biological evolution.
This is an existence proof that nature is able to achieve such a miracle. We
broach the universe as a whole below.
I do not believe that these evolutionary processes are algorithmic, (13, 14).
We have no theory of enabling constraints and what they enable, which I also
do not think are algorithmic in general. I have no idea how to study enabling
constraints and what they enable in general, so I now sketch the earliest stages
of an admittedly limited and algorithmic approach to this question that is now
underway.
Consider chess. The rules of chess are the enabling constraints, the laws of
the world of chess. They enable very sophisticated, strategic play, as many of
us more or less know. We do not understand, in general, enabling constraints,
and what poor or superb ’strategies’ can emerge as in the history of chess play.
But a few observations start a discussion. Note that, given the move rules of
chess, the Adjacent Possible for White, or for Black, is fully determined for each
board position. Then I propose to ask, as a game proceeds, what happens to the
’size’ of the adjacent possible for each side. In the end game, typically the losing
side has almost no adjacent possible, while the winning side has a very large
adjacent possible. How does this happen? How is it related to the search depth
of computer chess programs playing one another, whether of equal ’strength’ or
different strengths? I intend to find out in this simple case.
Note that in chess the bishop can move along a diagonal that is free, regard-
less of the position of the same side’s rook, as long as the rook does not block the
diagonal. The movements of chess pieces are largely independent of one another
except for blocking. But one can imagine chess - like rules in which all positions
of the rooks impacted the legal moves of the bishop. Or in which all positions
of all pieces impacted the allowed moves of the bishop. As one tinkers with the
move rules, and the dependencies of pieces moves on one another’s positions,
what happens to the games that are enabled? What happens to the adjacent
possible? We don’t know. Are the most complex games achieved, under a to be
determined criterion of ’complex’, if the pieces moves are largely independent
of one another? I have no idea.
My colleagues and I are also starting work on board games in which each
side has M pieces, each piece has, for each board condition a set of allowed
next positions. Thus, the adjacent possible for all board positions is perfectly
defined. As we tune the dependency of each piece’s moves on the positions
of is own sides other pieces, what happens to the adjacent possible of each
piece and why? If we start in the same position and step randomly several
steps into the successive adjacent possibles of a piece, and repeat this sequence
many times, do these ’histories’ spread out widely? Do they converge? Are
there some board positions reachable by very many other board positions, and
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others that are hardly accessible? If so why? What are the implications of this
possible variation in adjacent possible board positions on the flow of the games
we envision next.
We plan to study games where each side can ’take’ a piece from the other side
by occupying its position via a legal move, as in chess or checkers. We propose
to allow two depth search, so each side can both ’try’ to take an opponent’s piece
and try to avoid having its own pieces taken. A game will be won when all pieces
of one side are taken. We propose to evolve the rules of moving the pieces, so
that winning players (or both winners and losers) can alter their move rules to
a set of ’next move rules’ to evolve toward rules that allow longer more complex
games. One measure of the complexity of a game is to replay the same game
multiple times, treat a board position as a vector, and concatenate successive
board positions of one game until the game is won into a long vector. Repeated
games will give some diversity of these vectors. The ’normalized compression
distance’, (22), between many pairs of games can then be computed, to gain
a measure of how diverse games under a given set of move rules are. This
diversity is one measure of game complexity. As the move rules evolve toward
more complex games, we hope to look at the dependency of each piece’s adjacent
possible move space on the positions of other pieces of the same side. I hope we
find that ’complex games’ evolve relative independence of one piece’s moves on
another’s positions except blocking positions.
In short, a new body of theory is needed where virtually none exists: What
are enabling constraints and what possibilities do they enable? Board games
are interesting because they are so well defined. They are inadequate because
the move rules enabled by the Cairo hospital were not algorithmic, as are the
board games. An entire new field of research is needed. I believe and feel sure it
is worth exploring. All our legal codes, regulations, the biosphere and perhaps,
as I try to discuss next, the very physical laws of the universe, are enabling
constraints. What do they enable? How?
Notice for further discussion, that the move rules define an Adjacent Possible.
Below I ask where does ’the possible’ come from?
6 Might the Laws of Physics Be Abiotically
Selected Enabling Constraints?
Where are we now in fundamental physics and cosmology? We have the Stan-
dard Model and General Relativity, and as yet no clear way to unite them. If
the above argument about lawlessness and abiotic blind final cause at the quan-
tum classical boundary is right, we may never unite the two. If blind final cause
is present in the evolution of the universe including the biosphere, let alone
human culture, there may be no theory of everything entailing all that occurs.
Meanwhile, we have the well known ’fine tuning’ of the 23 constants of nature.
It is widely believed that without this fine tuning we would not be in a complex
universe with stars, simple and complex atoms, chemistry and life. But we have
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no rationale for why the constants have the values they do.
In face of this fine tuning, the current view in physics is of a multiverse, where
each ’pocket’ universe has its own values of the constants, perhaps randomly
distributed, and either the strong or weak Anthropic principle. The former
looks to a Creator God to tune the constants and is held to be outside science.
The latter assumes that only those universes with constants disposed to allow
stars, complex atoms, chemistry and life would have physicists to puzzle about
why the constants of their pocket universe were so tuned as to allow their
existence. Probably the weak Anthropic principle is the dominant view among
physicists today. Leonard Susskind, confronted with 10 to the 500th string
theories, envisions a cosmic landscape, with as many pocket universes, each with
a random choice of string theory from among the 10 to the 500th, and we are
the lucky ones, (23). Lee Smolin, in Life of the Cosmos, (24), imagines universes
born from black holes and emerging with minor variations of the constants, so a
cosmic natural selection among universes for those that are more fecund because
they have many black holes.
It is worth stressing that reductionism itself is what is driving us to the
multiverse. If we cannot account for the fine tuning of the 23 constants of
nature, and if all that arises in any universe is deductively entailed in its efficient
cause Final Theory of Everything, there is no choice but some space of possible
laws or one set of laws but many choices of values of the 23 constants, multiple
universes, and some way of distributing the laws, or constants, among these
universes. But, as I note in a moment, Darwin tells us that we are not limited
to efficient causes, and that may change everything.
I now propose ’Darwin all the way down’. Suppose that there was, in the
beginning, or in a ’possible’ before the beginning as I try to discuss below,
an indefinitely or infinitely large set of laws to create universes - I’ll give a
conceivable example in a moment - and a cosmic natural selection selected, in
just one universe, those laws which, as enabling constraints, enabled our very
complex universe precisely because it was able to grow large and complex, hence
by persistent winning ’existence’, won Existence and persistence are the abiotic
analogues of the persistence of saber tooth tigers existence and persistence in the
biosphere. Existence and persistence of a ’winning’ universe that does so ’the
best’, is the analogue of Pross’s kinetic selection in a non-equilibrium chemical
replicator system. We will see and are the winners.
We then are in this universe, because, Darwin-like, it is the universe that won
by blind final cause. We now answer, in principle, a why question and answer
not just with an efficient cause ’how’ answer, but a ’why’ answer. Our universe
won and was able to become a very or most complex universe. That is why our
universe is as it is. For us to be satisfied, what constitutes ’winning’ for a uni-
verse must itself be ’natural’. For example, I want to believe that the biosphere
evolves, as a secular trend, to maximize its Adjacent Possible in the non-ergodic
universe: Perhaps as species diversity and features per species and complexity
of features increase, the ease of forming positive sum games and mutualisms
increases, driving further diversification of organized processes in the biosphere.
Perhaps the winning universe wins by maximizing its Adjacent Possible into
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which it can ’become’ more rapidly than universes that grow their Adjacent
Possibles more slowly. Like the biosphere, the universe as a whole is vastly non-
ergodic. The metaphor is at least suggestive. Science sometimes starts with
a mere metaphoric image that later crystallizes usefully. The metaphor of the
solar system for atoms is a famous example.
We must note that any effort along these lines is radically unlike familiar
physics, for we are attempting to formulate the question: how are physical laws
enabling constraints and what kinds of universes do they enable? And if there
are a multitude of laws, how might an abiotic natural selection process with blind
final cause work to select among the laws? And what constitutes a ”winning”
universe that might, by blind final cause, select the laws that enable it?
I briefly mention a ’vacuum selection’ principle of which I am the author,
(13). It is only of interest as an example to show that such a vacuum selection
principle might be possible. Smolin and colleagues have explored loop quantum
gravity, (25). Here Planck scale tetrahedra of quantized units of space build a
universe by budding or cloning new tetrahedra on their faces, via Pachner moves,
where the tetrahedra are linked by what are called 15J symbols. As Louis Crane
showed, these 15J symbols, all integers, form a denumerably infinite series of
laws, (26), so can be pictured as a space of laws with an ordering relation among
them. Each 15J symbol implies the way the discrete analogue of the Schrodinger
equation propagates on the space constructed by the tetrahedra. My idea was
to allow uncertainty of the laws themselves in an early universe, with a universe
starting in one state of geometry, (and ultimately particles), with one 15J sym-
bol, and following all possible paths to a final state where the 15J laws were
different. Thus, if the particles under these different laws, or geometries them-
selves, could interact, quantum interference could arise. I reasoned that some
small changes in the 15J symbols could yield large changes in Schrodinger prop-
agation, hence yield destructive interference. Other small changes could yield,
I hoped, very small changes in how the Schrodinger equation propagated possi-
bility amplitudes, so lead to constructive interference. More slowly, Feynmann
showed in his sum over all possible histories formulation of quantum electrody-
namics, that nearly parallel pathways interfered constructively, while radically
twisting pairs of pathways interfered destructively, so near classical parallel be-
havior was the most probable. Generalizing to the case where there is to be
uncertainty over the laws themselves, and summing over all histories from all
initial to all final states of tetrahedral space, with the same or different 15J
symbols, I hoped, mere sum over all possible pathways and constructive inter-
ference, as Feynmann showed with a single Schrodinger equation, would pick
out the region(s) in the denumerably infinite space of laws where constructive
interference among a neighboring set of laws would arise where small changes in
15 J symbols yielded tiny changes in how the Shrodinger equation propagated,
hence a universe whose laws, if initially fluctuating slightly, showed constructive
interference, would arise. Ultimately, this universe would select out a single law
15J law. This simple example, merely conceptual, is the start of a possible vac-
uum selection principle among an infinite set of laws in a single universe with
an infinite set of possible laws, yet might be able to select the laws and ulti-
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mately, I hoped, the constants, the particles, and all. If even logically possible,
this putative vacuum selection principle suffices as an example of a way a single
universe might evolve its own laws. No multiverse is needed here. If not, we are
not forced, e ven by reductionism in the sum over histories and laws above, to
a unique or very small set of neighboring laws, to posit a multiverse.
But there may be other vacuum selection principles evolving the laws if
we allow forms of blind final cause for a ’winning universe’ selecting among
the possible laws, all in one universe evolving its laws so it ’becomes’ better.
In the case above of my hoped for vacuum selection principle by constructive
interference over sets of 15J laws, we already have a Feynmann framework to
understand what ’winning’ might mean - constructive interference. As noted, we
need to explore a wider set of what a winning universe that exists and persists
might mean and how that could ”blindly” select among enabling constraint laws
that enable its Adjacent Possible.
Since we do not know what enabling constraints enable what kind of universe,
only hints are available now. What might they be? It would seem, as noted just
above, that ’getting to persist’ - like saber tooth tigers - would be important.
Perhaps relative local independence of classical events, like the bishop’s moves
independent of the rook or the same in complex board games, might be essen-
tial to a winning universe that can become big and complex, or maximize the
growth of its Adjacent Possible, hence win. There are clues to such ’move inde-
pendence’. Nother’s theorem, (27), shows that where there are symmetries, for
example of force applied and acceleration achieved, with temporal, translational
and rotational invariances, conservation of energy, momentum and angular mo-
mentum are entailed. Why should these independencies with respect to these
spatial and motion symmetries be a feature of our laws of physics? Bishops and
rooks? Does this enable a universe with a larger Adjacent Possible? Perhaps,
in due course, this still intuitive question can be formulated precisely.
Our particles form a group, with its symmetries. The group property implies
that the particles transform into one another, hence persist. What if particles
did not do this, but transformed into a spray of ever new particles such that,
even were reversibility allowed, they created an infinite ’jet’ of particle types
that would emerge. Then nothing would persist.
Could such group particle properties emerge from the evolution of random
laws? No one knows. But I now report remarkable results that hint the answer
could be yes.
I describe a wonderful numerical experiment some years ago by Walter
Fontana, (28), at the Santa Fe Institute. Fontana created a ’chemostat’ on
his computer which contained up to 50,000 Lisp expressions. Lisp expressions
were chosen randomly to act on Lisp expressions typically yielding new Lisp ex-
pressions. Selective conditions were maintained by randomly throwing out Lisp
expressions if there were more than 50,000 in the computer chemostat. Fontana
found that at first a stream of unique Lisp expressions were generated. Then one
of two things happened. First, a Lisp expression able to copy itself emerged and
took over the chemostat. If copying was disallowed, collectively autocatalytic
sets of Lisp expressions emerged, in which each was formed by one or more of
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the Lisp expression present. Fontana found that these collectively autocatalytic
sets of Lisp expressions formed an algebra, but not a group in that they lacked
an inverse and an identity operator. Nevertheless, his numerical experiment is
a toy example of entities bootstrapping themselves via random laws co-evolving
into self consistent co-creation and stable existence and persistence. It is a long
way to elementary particles forming a group, and transmitting forces, but per-
haps a hint. The transformations among the Lisp expressions are mediated by
Lisp expressions and seem the analogue of forces carried by particles acting to
transform particles into one another in a group. If models can be explored which
include the possibilities of reversible transformations mediated by the same ’ex-
pression’ acting on two interconverting pairs of ’expressions’, and a ’do nothing’
expression, perhaps autocatalytic sets of expressions might emerge from a soup
of co-evolving random ’laws’ or ’expressions’ and form algebraic groups, (29).
Why are there conservation laws like that for a perfect harmonic oscillator,
free of friction? In the state space of position and velocity, orbits are concentric
curves. Adjacent curves have 0 Lyapunov exponents. Thus, they are dynam-
ically critical, and can persist and propagate information without loss due to
convergence in state space nor, in a noisy world, loss due to a positive Lyapunov
exponent and chaos. Why? Electromagnetic waves propagate, exist and persist
therefore, across the universe. They can propagate information extremely well.
Why such conservation laws? What do they enable? Do they enable a larger
Adjacent Possible for an emerging universe?
We do live in an extremely complex universe. If we take the fine tuning
arguments seriously, this is a profound puzzle. Just perhaps abiotic natural
selection provides a radical but ultimately useful new way to think about this.
If so, Godel is not the end of physics, but all this is a possible new beginning in
an open universe.
7 The Possible
How can we begin to think about ’the possible’? It seems we have to consider
the possible and its ontological status. We seem to need ’a possible’. I will
proceed in steps based on physical theory and beyond.
First, consider General Relativity and Einstein’s block universe. Here there
are no possibilities at all, only actual geometric world lines. Next consider New-
ton, where a state of the system in space and time has a possible future and past
deterministic trajectory. It is not much of a possible, but more than in General
Relativity. Next consider quantum mechanics on the Copenhagen interpretation
and Born rule. Here we have at the fundamental level, a Schrodinger equation
for possibility waves. So we seem forced, on Copenhagen at least, to consider
the ’possible’. But notice an odd fact. We know beforehand exactly what the
quantum degrees of freedom are, spin, polarization, and so forth, that we will
measure. Whitehead, in Process and Reality, (30), considers a metaphysics
of Actuals giving rise to Possibles that give rise to Actuals. But in quantum
mechanics, such as Quantum Electrodynamics, possibles can give rise to pos-
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sibles in Feynmann’s sum over all possible histories and his famous Feynmann
diagrams.
Now consider the evolution of the biosphere by Darwinian preadaptations.
We seem to confront an Adjacent Possible of the biosphere where, unlike the
possibles of quantum mechanics, we cannot prestate the relevant degrees of
freedom, eg swim bladders. Unlike familiar quantum mechanics, we do not even
know what the variables might be. This failure may be due to the failure of
human language to describe all of ’relational’ reality in a continuous spacetime
in a denumerably infinite language. In any case, we seem forced to consider ’the
possible’, even one we cannot prestate. The same is true for the evolution from
the computer to FaceBook and history with its Cairo hospital. Who foresaw the
changes in medical training and practice that were enabled, became possible,
then actual?
’The Possible’ produces confusion because, in part, we live among White-
head’s Actuals. As with consciousness itself, we don’t know ’where’ the possible
is in space and time.
Consider any physical theory which posits a multiverse with a set of possible
values of the 23 constants, or Susskind’s Cosmic Landscape with pocket uni-
verses having one of the 10 to the 500th string theories. Then it seems we are
forced to consider a set of ’possible’ values of the constants, or string theories,
somehow assigned to, or coming into existence with, universes in the multiverse.
What sense does it make to speak of these possibles before there are any uni-
verses? It seems physicists may have slipped into speaking of these possibles as,
in some sense, real possibilities, outside of any universe(s) that exist, whatever
that means. Can there ’be’ a ’possible’ before’ one or many universes exist and
out of which it or they can become? Can a ’possible’ make any sense without
the enabling constraints that seem to define it?
If we can speak of possible values of the 23 constants assigned somehow to
pocket universes, or 10 to the 500th string theories assigned somehow to pocket
universes, then it seems no stranger to consider a space of possible laws, for
example the 10 to the 500th string theories, before there is our one universe
and a very rapid vacuum selection principle, perhaps like mine above, that, in
a single universe, selects by constructive interference among competing laws,
or by blind final cause, that universe that ’wins’. Like the weak Anthropic
principle, such a vacuum selection would answer the question why the constants
have the values they do. And it would answer the question: why these laws and
partial lawlessness. But as noted, to base our thinking on an abiotic natural
selection among a family of laws, perhaps infinite, to answer this question means
understanding what a ’winning’ universe might be, how the enabling constraint
laws enable that winning universe, and how it wins over other universes in the
early evolution of our one universe and thereby selects its own laws. Like the
evolution of sex and reconbination and Mendel’s laws, are our physical laws
’enabling constraints’ that became hardened and entrenched as the universe
itself evolved, such that the universe was then constrained to those law? If the
discussion above, in whole, is correct, to pursue this avenue means giving up
the reductionist dream of a final theory, but it may open wide new doors in an
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open creative universe.
Conclusion
Reductionism has been a brilliant success. It is built upon the mathmatization
of efficient cause and that cause as deductive entailment. It appears that this is
insufficient to describe the becoming of the biosphere by adaptive evolution and
more the evolution of the biosphere by Darwinian preadaptations. The consid-
erations above, together with Hawkings Godel and the End of Physics, suggest
we may be approaching a crisis in which 350 years of reductionistic science will
give way not only to emergence, but to an open universe, partially enabled by
enabling constraint laws, partially lawless, uniting physics with history. There
may be lawlessness at the quantum-classical interface, making a Theory of Ev-
erything that explains by entailment impossible. This one universe may have
evolved by abiotic natural selection among an infinite or vast set of laws to be a
winning universe, perhaps by maximizing the growth of its own Adjacent Possi-
ble, hence its own growth. There might be an approach to the ancient question:
Why is there something rather than nothing? Hawkings Godel and the End of
Physics may be only the beginning of a new physics.
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